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ABSTRACT
Fires and burns are among the leading causes of unintentional death in the U.S.   Most of these deaths
occur in residences, and cigarettes are a primary cause.  In this paper, I explore the relationship between
smoking, cigarette policies, and fires. As fewer people smoke, there are less opportunities for fires,
however, the magnitude of any reduction is in question as the people who quit may not necessarily
start fires.  Using a state-level panel, I find that reductions in smoking and increases in cigarette prices












Fires and burns are among the top ten leading causes of unintentional 
death in the United States, with thousands of deaths occurring annually (over 
2,750 in 2009).  The young and the elderly are particularly vulnerable, with fires 
and burns as the third leading cause for children ages 1-14 and the fifth leading 
cause for those ages 65 and older (CDC 2009).  Non-fatal injuries from fires are 
much more common with an estimated 381,000 occurring nationwide in 2009.  
The majority of these deaths and injuries result from residential fires.  Residential 
and commercial building fires are fairly common in the United States, with over 
500,000 such fires occurring annually (Karter 2010).  Cigarette smoking is one of 
the more common causes of these fires, and while the proportion of all fires 
caused by cigarettes is relatively small, about 2.8 percent, these fires are among 
the most deadly.  In fact, the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) reports that 
smoking is the first or second leading cause of fire deaths every year, occasionally 
alternating places with arson. (USFA 2004).    
Fires place tremendous burdens on society through the direct costs of 
damage to life and property, and through the indirect costs that include funding 
for public fire departments, providing fire protection within buildings, insurance 
costs and medical costs.  Karter (2010) estimates the costs of damage to property 
from fires was over $15.4 billion in 2008.
1  Fortunately, the number of fires in the 
U.S. has been trending down over time (see Figure 1).  Part of this trend includes 
a decline in residential fires caused by cigarettes and declines in deaths and 
injuries over time.  There are likely many different factors that are responsible for 
these trends including the growth in the use of smoke detectors, sprinkler systems, 
fires safety education programs, and stricter flammability standards for 
mattresses, upholstery and fabrics.   
                                                 
1 Direct plus indirect costs are estimated at $165 billion a year (USFA 2007).  
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  Concurrent with the decline in fires caused by cigarettes is a downward trend 
in cigarette smoking over time.  Along with broad scale public health and 
educational campaigns, increases in cigarette taxes and restrictions on smoking 
have contributed to the decline in smoking in the United States (Tauras 2006; 
Dube et al. 2009; Debrot et al. 2010).   
This paper explores the relationship between cigarette smoking and fires 
caused by cigarettes.  Co-movement in the two trends is logical; as fewer people 
take up smoking and more people quit, there is less opportunity for fires to start as 
a result of cigarettes.  However, it is not clear that the people who avoid smoking 
are also the careless ones who start fires.  The magnitude of the reduction in fires 
resulting from decreased smoking rates is therefore an empirical question.  In this 
paper, I quantify the effects of reductions in smoking on rates of fires, deaths and 
injuries.  I also examine how much of a contribution tobacco-related control 
policies have in altering the incidence of cigarette-related fires.  Specifically, I 
estimate the effects of increases in cigarette prices, taxes, and the implementation 
of restrictions on smoking in public places on counts of cigarette fires in various 
locations and resulting deaths and injuries. 
The harms from smoking are well known, and include the harmful health 
effects to the smoker, the harmful health effects to those involuntarily exposed to 
environmental tobacco smoke, and harm to developing fetuses.  Previous research 
has examined the public health benefits of reduced smoking rates in terms of 
reductions in disease prevalence, increased length of life and improved birth 
outcomes (USDHHS 2004).  Economists focus their research questions on 
whether increased cigarette prices and taxes contribute to improved health 
outcomes.  This paper extends this literature by examining the question of 
whether reduced smoking rates and higher cigarette prices and restrictions on 
smoking have reduced fires, deaths and injuries.  The results show that reductions 
in smoking and increases in cigarette prices are associated with fewer fires.   
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However, restrictions on indoor smoking are associated with increases in some 
types of fires, including those in bars and restaurants. 
 
Mechanisms 
Karter et al. (1994) discuss the three elements that must be present for a 
cigarette fire to start.  First, there must be contact between the cigarette and the 
fuel source.  Second is the likelihood of the cigarette to ignite the fuel source.  
Last is the susceptibility of the fuel source to ignite upon exposure.   Efforts in 
fire prevention have typically focused on reducing the ability of cigarettes to 
ignite a fuel source, and on reducing the propensity of the fuel source to burn.  For 
example, fire safe cigarette laws have been passed in all fifty states (with the 
effective date in a few states still yet to come).  These cigarettes are made with 
banded paper that allows the cigarette to self-extinguish.   From the fuel source 
side, a variety of mandatory and voluntary standards have been in place for 
decades.  These include flammability standards for mattresses, upholstery, and 
apparel, portable heating units, and lamps.  (See Frazier et al. 2000 for more 
details.) 
The main element in starting a fire, contact between the cigarette and the 
fuel source, comes from human carelessness (Karter et al. 1994).  The degree of 
carelessness or vulnerability may vary among smokers and along observable and 
unobservable characteristics.  For example, The National Fire Protection 
Association estimates that the risk of dying in a smoking-related fire rises with 
age, with 38 percent of victims ages 65 or older (Hall 2006).  This is much larger 
than the elderly’s share in the population of around 12 percent.  Alcohol 
consumption also has been cited as a contributing factor to cigarette fires (Patetta 
and Cole 1990). 
There are a number of scenarios by which a cigarette can start a fire.  A 
common story starts with an improperly discarded cigarette, where burning  
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cigarettes, ashes, embers, or butts cause ignition of a fuel source.  The most 
deadly smoking-related fires occur when cigarettes ignite mattresses, bedding, or 
upholstered furniture.  Falling asleep and alcohol or drug impairment are leading 
human factors associated with these fires.  Approximately 40 percent of 
residential smoking fires originate in the bedroom or living/family rooms (USFA 
2005).   
The primary question of this paper is whether the number of fire incidents 
can be reduced through public policies that alter the demand for cigarettes.  To 
answer this question, I take advantage of a large number of policy changes that 
have been occurred in recent years.  Following the Master Settlement Agreement 
of 1998, numerous states and the federal government raised excise taxes on 
cigarettes and tobacco companies raised prices.  A wave of new smoke-free air 
laws have been enacted in states, with tremendous variation on the degree of the 
restrictions and the public places to which the laws pertain.  Recent studies find 
negative price and tax effects on different measures of smoking (Adda and 
Cornaglia, 2010;  DeCicca and McLeod 2008; Stehr 2005).  Several econometric 
studies have also examined the effects of smoke-free air laws on adult smoking 
behavior.  A majority of these studies find an inverse relationship between the 
implementation of these laws and smoking (Wasserman et al. 1991; Chaloupka 
1992; Evans et al. 1999; Ohsfeldt et al. 1999; Czart, et al. 2001; Gallet 2004; 
Tauras 2006; Yurkeli and Zhang 2000). 
Results by Adda and Cornaglia (2010) are particularly relevant.  As part of 
their study on the influence of cigarette policies on second hand smoke exposure, 
they find that bans in bars and restaurants are associated with a reduction in the 
prevalence of smoking and per capita consumption of cigarettes, while bans in 
workplaces are not statistically related to these measures of smoking.  Using time 
use surveys, they look at how smokers change their time spent at home and in 
restaurants and bars in response to smoking bans.  They find that bans in bars and  
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restaurants are associated with a reduction in time spent in these locations and an 
increase in time spent at home by smokers.  This result has implications for 
changes in the likelihood of starting a residential fire if smoking moves from 
public places to private residences as a result of a smoking ban. 
 
The effects of stricter cigarette policies on smoking and fires 
While studies on the consumption effects of tobacco control policies are 
informative, they provide only part of the story for cigarette-related fires.  
Consider the following:  Let F represent the number of fires started by improperly 
discarded cigarettes.  The number of fires is determined by the total number of 
smokers (S), which is the sum of careful (SC) and not careful smokers  (SN).  Each 
type of smoker has a different propensity to start a fire with probabilities α0 < α1.  
Note that both probabilities are also affected by conditions unrelated to cigarettes 
such as the susceptibility of the fuel source to ignite upon exposure to cigarettes:   
1)  F=α0SC + α1SN. 
An increase in the price of cigarettes will decrease the total number of smokers, 








If the price increase reduces smoking only among careful smokers then the 
decrease in fires will be proportional to α0 and in the extreme, could be zero if α0 
is zero.  If the price increase reduces smoking solely among the careless smokers 
then the decrease in fires will depend on α1 and will be relatively larger.  In 
general, the total reduction in fires will depend on the price elasticities of demand 
by the different types of smokers, and the values of α0 and α1. 
By contrast, the enactment of smoke-free air laws may have very different 
effects.  Consider a law restricting or banning smoking in indoors public places  
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(L).  Such a law may not only influence the demand for cigarettes, but may alter 
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The partial derivatives of the alphas with respect to a change in the law will be 
positive if the law changes smoking behaviors towards less safe disposal methods.  
For example, a ban on smoking in bars or restaurants may cause people to smoke 
outside where smokers may discard cigarettes in plants or mulch rather than in a 
safer ash tray.  Another example follows from Adda and Corneliga (2010).  If 
smokers move their smoking from public places to private residences, this may 
change the probability of a fire occurring, and perhaps increase the probability of 
a death or injury.  Note that any such effect will vary depending on the type of 
law enacted and any compensative fire-safety measures taken.  The total effect on 
fires also depends on the change in the number of smokers arising from the 
change in the law.  As discussed above, previous research has show that some of 
the indoor smoking bans encourage people to quit smoking, leading to reductions 
in SC and SN as a result.  Therefore, the net effect of the laws are indeterminate, 
depending on the magnitudes of the offsetting positive and negative effects of the 
laws.   
 
Data and Empirical Methods 
Data on fires in the United States come from the National Fire Incident 
Reporting System (NFIRS) developed by the U.S. Fire Administration.  This 
system was implemented to monitor and assess the fire problem in the United 
States.  NFIRS began with six states in 1976 and has grown over time.  The 
reporting format changed in 1999, and this is the year in which I begin the 
analysis.  I have obtained NFIRS data through 2007.  Reporting in 1999 is limited 
to 40 states, but by 2007, fire departments in all 50 states plus the District of  
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Columbia report.  In addition to new states, the number of reporting fire 
departments also increased between 1999-2007, growing from approximately 
9000 fire departments in 1999 to over 16,000 in 2007.  The USFA estimates that 
44 percent of all fire departments in the U.S. report to the NFIRS, providing 
information on all fires to which those department respond (USFA 2008). 
  The fire departments that participate in the NFIRS record information on each 
individual fire.  This information includes the time and place of the fire, the cause 
and heat source, any resulting injuries and deaths, and rather infrequently, an 
estimate of the dollar amount of property and content loss.
2  From this 
information, I generate three different dependent variables to measure the damage 
from fires caused by cigarette smoking.  The first is a simple count of the number 
of fires caused by cigarettes.  The second is a count of the number of deaths 
resulting from cigarette fires.  The third is a count of the number of deaths plus 
injuries from cigarette fires.  I group deaths and injuries together because factors 
such as emergency medical response time or available medical technology may 
determine the difference between an injury and a death.  Deaths and injuries are 
recorded for both firefighters and the victims.   
I explore four variations on the types of fires examined.  The first is a 
count of all types of fires caused by cigarettes.  This includes fires in residential 
and non-residential structures, fires in outside properties, fields and wild lands, 
and automobile fires.  Second, I limit the fires to only those occurring in 
residential units since the majority of cigarette fires and deaths occur in homes.  
Third, I limit the fires to those occurring in bars, restaurants and other eating and 
drinking establishments.  This restriction is particularly pertinent when examining 
some of the more common smoke-free air laws that ban smoking in public places.  
I examine restaurant fires separately from bar fires, and then I use a sum of 
                                                 
2 These losses are missing for 89% of the fires reported.  
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restaurants, bars, and an additional category for “eating, drinking places, other”.  
Lastly, in order to check for spurious results, I generate counts of fires caused by 
cooking.  These fires follow a similar trend to cigarette fires over time, yet 
logically should not be related to smoking or cigarette policies.  Any result here 
showing that cigarette policies are related to cooking fires could indicate that 
omitted variables are problematic for the other models. 
  The NFIRS data are reported at the fire incident level.  To generate the 
dependent variables, I aggregate the incidents reported by each fire department to 
the state level on a quarterly basis.  I treat New York and Illinois as special cases.  
Across the United States, a few localities impose local cigarette taxes in addition 
to the state taxes.  New York City and Chicago both have local cigarette taxes that 
are much higher than the state tax, and these municipalities also passed smoke 
free air laws at different times from the rest of the state.
3,4  For these reasons, and 
because both cities represent a large proportion of the fires in their states, I treat 
New York city and Chicago as separate observations.  The data therefore include 
as observations New York state exclusive of New York City, Illinois exclusive of 
Chicago, New York City and Chicago, all as different observations.  For 
simplicity, I will refer to the unit of observation as a state, with the understanding 
that these two cities are separate observations treated as a state. 
Next, I generate the population covered by the reporting fire departments 
in each state in each quarter.  To do so, I identify the unique zip codes associated 
with all fire incidents (including non-fire related calls) reported by each fire 
department in each state during a quarter.  Using year 2000 population 
                                                 
3 New York City’s ban on indoor smoking became effective March 30, 2003, four months before 
the state ban.  Chicago imposed a ban on smoking in private workplaces in January 2006.  The 
state’s restrictions did not begin until 2008. 
4 According to Orzechowski and Walker (2009), some cities in Alabama, Alaska, Missouri, Ohio, 
and Virginia also impose local cigarette taxes.  These taxes tend to be low, for example, ranging 
from 1 cent to 7 cents per pack in cities in Alabama and Missouri.  I ignore these taxes because the 
population affected by the taxes is small, and because these local taxes may be easily evaded.  
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information from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, I merge populations based on zip 
codes and sum the populations to the state level.  One issue here is that the 
covered population can be overstated if a zip code appears in the data that is not 
part of the reporting fire department’s district.  This can arise when a fire 
department assists another and reports the fire to the NFIRS.  When both 
departments report, there is no problem as the zip code will only get counted 
once.  However, when the assisting department reports, but the primary does not, 
attributing the zip code to the assisting department will understate the fire rate by 
overreporting the covered population.  To help minimize this problem, I restrict 
the zip codes included to those that have an incident at least three times in each 
quarter.  I also tested models that include 1) the population from all zip codes 
regardless of the number of times a code appears in the data and 2) the population 
from the zip codes that include only fire-related calls.  The results are generally 
insensitive to the construction of the covered population, with only the levels 
changing.  These results are available upon request.    
One concern with the NFIRS data, particularly with small fire 
departments, is whether a zero count of fires is a true zero or a missing value.  If a 
fire department reports any fire related call to the NFIRS during the quarter, I 
consider this as a reporting fire department and zero counts are assumed to be true 
zeros.  If a fire department reports no fire-related calls during a particular quarter, 
and although they may report in other quarters during the same year, I consider 
them a non-reporter in that quarter and exclude them from the analysis. 
Each fire in the NFIRS is assigned a heat source.  From this variable, I 
identify all the fires caused by cigarettes which is code ‘61’ in NFIRS version 5.0.  
To generate the total cigarette fire counts, I include all structural and outdoor fires 
with this code, as well as any wildland fires that were determined to be started by  
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cigarettes or other smoking material.
5  The counts of fires exclude exposure fires, 
that is, fires that spread from another fire.  The counts also exclude arson, 
suspected arson, and fires started by children playing.   
Cigarettes are identified as the cause of 2.6 to 4 percent of the fires in this 
data, however, a large portion of fires, 43 to 60 percent depending on the year in 
question, are of unknown causes.  Of the cases with a cause identified, a range of 
6.4 to 8.0 percent are caused by cigarettes.  It is difficult to know whether the fires 
that are indentified are a random sample, or if they represent either small fires 
with a source that is easy to determine, or large fires that undergo intense 
investigation.  Tests of means reveal statistically significant but very small 
differences in deaths and injuries and dollar losses based on whether or not the 
cause of the fire is reported.  Statistical significance is to be expected because the 
number of fires over the nine year period exceeds 5 million.  Across this time 
period, the average reported dollar losses of property and content is $10,372.30 
for cause-known sample and $12,164.10 for cause-unknown fires.  Deaths and 
injuries occur with mean count of 0.03 for cause-known sample and 0.02 for 
cause-unknown.  Thus, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the magnitudes 
and destructiveness of the fires based on the reported causes. 
The determinants of cigarette fires follows the general relationship: 
4)  Fjy = f(Cjy, Xjy, Y, S),  
Where F represents one of the three dependent variables (count of cigarette fires, 
deaths from cigarette fires, death plus injuries from cigarette fires) in state (j) in a 
given year (y).  The variable C represents per capita cigarette sales in a state for a 
given year, and the vector X represents some other characteristics of the states that 
                                                 
5 Wildland fires are defined as “Any fire involving vegetative fuels, other than prescribed fire, that 
occurs in the wildland. A wildland fire may expose and possibly consume structures.” (USFA 
2008 p C-8).    
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may determine fire rates (described below).  Lastly, Y and S are fixed effects for 
each unique year and state, respectively. 
  The estimation of equation 1 must be treated with some caution and 
skepticism because of the potential problem of endogeneity of cigarette 
consumption.  This will occur if there are unobserved, time varying characteristics 
of the states that are correlated with both cigarette consumption and the 
probability of fires.  As Karter et al. (1994) explain, the main element in cigarette 
fires are human carelessness.  It is possible that people with this characteristic also 
are less likely to engage in other risk-reducing behaviors and may exhibit an 
increased propensity to  smoke.  The state fixed effects will address any 
unobserved characteristics of the population that are time invariant, however, time 
varying factors may still remain in the error term and bias the estimates.  Another 
potential problem with the estimation of equation 1 is measurement error resulting 
from a mismatch of the cigarette sales to the locations of the fire.  The available 
sales data are aggregates for the entire state, whereas the fire counts are 
aggregated from reporting localities.  If for example, the bulk of sales are in a 
non-reporting fire district, then the match quality will be poor.  Instrumental 
variable models are used to address these potential biases.  The cigarette price and 
smoking restriction variables described below serve as instruments.      
  The reduced form equation is much more relevant from a policy 
perspective, and is therefore the primary focus of this paper.  In this equation, 
cigarette consumption is replaced by the exogenous determinants of consumption: 
5)  Fjyq = f(Pjy, Xjyq, YQ, S).  
Here, the variables are defined as above, and P is a vector of variables 
representing the full price of cigarettes.  This includes price or tax, and 
regulations regarding indoor smoking.  Details on these variables are discussed 
below.  Note that the reduced form analysis is conducted on a quarterly basis  
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since all variables are available quarterly.  In this model, YQ represents a set of 
unique indicator variables for each year and quarter.  
The distribution of the count of fires and related deaths and injuries 
suggest that a count model is the appropriate estimation technique.  Table 1 
contains summary statistics, and it is clear from this table that cigarette fire 
counts, deaths, and injuries are all relatively rare events.  For cigarette fires of all 
types, the mean fatality count for states during the period 1999-2007 is 0.64 
deaths per quarter, with a minimum of zero (65 percent of the observations) and a 
maximum of 9.  The sum of deaths and injuries have a similar distribution with a 
mean quarterly injury count of 4.0, a minimum of zero that occurs 33 percent of 
the time and a maximum count of 59.  Simple counts of cigarette fires are larger, 
with values ranging up to 1,085, and only 1.5 percent of the observations are zero.  
However, residential fires, restaurant fires and bar fires are much rarer, with 
maximums of 295, 35 and 5 respectively.  While some of these numbers may 
seem too small to be believable, recall that they represent the counts in the quarter 
by reporting fire departments, and in the regressions, are adjusted by the 
population covered by the reporting fire departments.   
I estimate all models with a Poisson maximum likelihood estimation, but 
to permit for overdispersion, standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity of 
unknown form that includes a within-state cluster correlation (Cameron and 
Trivedi 2009; Bertrand et al. 2004).  The advantage of the Poisson estimation is 
that the estimates are consistent regardless of whether the counts actually have a 
Poisson distribution (Wooldridge 2002).
6  Each model includes the log of the 
covered population as a right hand side variable to normalize for exposure.  The 
coefficient on this log population is constrained to equal one.     
                                                 
6 The Poisson model is preferred to the negative binomial since the negative binomial estimates 
are not consistent if the variance specification is incorrect (Cameron and Trivedi 2009).  
Nevertheless, negative binomial models were tested and give similar results.  
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Cigarette consumption is measured with the per capita number of packs of 
cigarettes sold annually in each state.  These data come from the Tax Burden on 
Tobacco (Orzechowski and Walker 2009).
7  Cigarette prices and taxes represent 
the monetary price of cigarettes.  Cigarette price and tax data also come from the 
annual Tax Burden on Tobacco.  The prices are weighted averages for a pack of 
20 cigarettes and are inclusive of state excise taxes.  Because the price published 
is as of November 1 of each year, the prices are adjusted to create a state-level 
average quarterly price.  Quarterly taxes are determined using the effective date of 
legislated tax changes.  Cigarette prices and taxes are deflated by the national 
Consumer Price Index published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1982-
1984=100).   
Variables representing smoking regulations in private workplaces, 
restaurants, and bars are included as additional measure of the full price of 
cigarettes.  These variables come from project ImpacTeen 
(http://www.impacteen.org/tobaccodata.htm) and the American Nonsmokers’ 
Rights Foundation (http://no-smoke.org/).  The laws are appended to the fire data 
by state, year, and quarter, based on the effective dates of the laws.  Even though 
states have smoke-free area (SFA) laws regarding many different establishments, 
these are the focus of this paper because private workplace and restaurant 
restrictions are very common and research has shown there to be an influence of 
these individual laws on smoking behaviors (Evans et al. 1999; Tauras 2004).   
While research on bar bans has shown much less effectiveness, restrictions on 
smoking in bars is relevant for studying fires, especially there is some evidence 
that alcohol consumption is a contributing factor to residential fires started by 
cigarettes (Hall 2006). 
The SFA laws for private workplaces are grouped in three categories: 1) 
                                                 
7 In the Tax Burden, consumption is reported as of June 30 of each year.  From this, I generate a 
calendar year consumption measure by using an average of the relevant fiscal years.  
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no provisions; 2) laws that restrict smoking to designated areas (some laws 
specify separate ventilation) with some exemptions; and 3) smoking bans that are 
present at all times.  A similar grouping is used for laws pertaining to restaurants.  
For bars, only the categories of ban versus no ban are used.  Only three states 
have some intermediate form of restrictions and two of these states do not change 
this value over time.  Therefore, these three states are grouped with the no ban 
states.  I then create dichotomous indicators for each category and site 
(workplaces, restaurants and bars) to include in the regressions.  The category of 
no provisions serves as the omitted reference group.  Because of the high degree 
of collinearity between the regulations, each group of SFA laws is included 
separately in the regressions according to the site.  The collinearity arises because 
many states pass SFA laws applicable to different facilities at the same time.  If 
these laws are considered as simple indexes (i.e. one variable with values 1 
through 3), the simple correlations between restrictions in private workplaces and 
restaurants is 0.69, between private workplaces and bars is 0.47, and between bars 
and restaurants is 0.60. 
As an alternative measure of the restrictiveness of indoor smoking in a 
state, I use the percent of the state population covered by 100% smoke-free air 
laws for each of the three sites, as provided by the American Nonsmokers’ Rights 
Foundation.  These measures are advantageous since they include the local area 
laws that are frequently passed prior to state-level laws.  Within each state, the 
percentages increase over time, and reach a maximum of 100% when the state 
enacts a ban on smoking in the relevant indoor area. 
Each model includes some other state-level time varying variables to 
account for additional factors which may be associated with the number of fires 
over time.
8  All models include the quarterly unemployment rate from the Bureau 
                                                 
8 New York City and Chicago are assigned the state value for these variables.  
15 
 
of Labor Statistics and per capita income from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
From the U.S. Census Bureau, the percent of each state’s population with at least 
a bachelor’s degree and the number of housing units per square mile are also 
included.  Next, I include a dichotomous indicator for the states which have a fire 
safe cigarette law in effect.  Most states have just recently passed this law.  In the 
time span of my data, New York is the first state (effective 6/28/2004), followed 
by Vermont (effective 5/1/2006), California (effective 1/1/2007), Oregon 
(effective 7/1/2007) and New Hampshire (effective 10/1/2007).  Lastly all models 
include state fixed effects and year/quarter fixed effects.   
 
Results 
Figure 1 shows the trends in fires over time.  There is a distinct seasonality 
to fires, with more occurring in the spring and summer months.  There is also a 
downward trend in fires over time, with a slight increase occurring after 2003.  
Figure 2 repeats Figure 1, but shows the annual trends in fires and adds the trends 
in cigarette consumption per capita.  Here, the general downward trend in both 
series is clearly seen.  The reason for the change in the trend for all fires after 
2003 is not clear.  Some of this may reflect reporting changes, for example, there 
is an increased reporting of wildland fires over time, but these fires constitute only 
about 10 percent of total cigarette fires.  The change may have also arisen from 
the increases in the number of smoke-free air laws over time.  As I show below, 
these laws tend to be positively associated with the incidence of fires.  
Turning to the multivariable analysis, Table 2 shows the basic relationship 
between annual per capita cigarette sales and annual counts of cigarette fires, 
adjusted for the covered population.  Table 3 contains similar results for counts of 
deaths and injuries.  In all these models I aggregate the fire counts to the annual 
level to more closely match the annual sales data.  Poisson models treating 
cigarette sales as exogenous are presented first, followed by models that treat  
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sales as endogenous.  The latter models are estimated using a two-step procedure 
described by Wooldridge (2002) for count models with endogenous right hand 
side variables.  The first step is an OLS regression of sales on the cigarette price, 
the dichotomous indicators of the smoke-free air laws in private workplaces, and 
all other exogenous variables in the model.
9  The residuals from the first stage 
regression are then predicted and included as an additional covariate in the second 
stage structural model, which is estimated by Poisson regression.  Standard errors 
are adjusted to be panel-robust (correlated among states), and the resulting 
estimates are consistent.  An F-test of the instruments is presented, and the 
endogeneity of the consumption measures are tested by examining the t-statistic 
on the first stage residuals in the second equation.   
In Table 2, the coefficients on the cigarette sales in the exogenous models 
are statistically insignificant for all of the types of fires.  However, when sales is 
treated as endogenous, a few of the coefficients become positive and statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level or better.  The F-stat on the instruments in the 
first stage is statistically significant, with a value of 8.95.  T-tests on the first stage 
residuals reject the null hypothesis that the cigarette sales coefficient is zero in 
three of the five models.  The exceptions are residential fires and bar fires.  Thus, 
these results provide some evidence that cigarette sales are positively related to 
the incidence of fires and not a result of spurious concurrent trends.   
Table 3 shows the results of the structural model for fire deaths and 
injuries.  Models are shown for all fires and for residential fires only since there 
are almost no deaths or injuries recorded in the NFIRS data for bars and 
restaurants.  The results shown here indicate a positive, but statistically 
insignificant relationship between cigarette sales and deaths and injuries.     
While the structural model is suggestive of the positive relationship 
                                                 
9 Models using the other SFA laws give similar results.  
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between smoking and fires, the reduced form model is much more relevant for 
policy purposes.  It directly shows the effects of changes in the policies on fires, 
while avoiding the potential endogeneity problems of the aggregate measures of 
smoking.  Tables 4-6 show the reduced form estimates for all fires, residential 
fires, and bar and restaurant fires.  The main models use the cigarette price or tax 
and the indicator variables for the different SFA laws.  Alternative models are 
shown in Tables 7 and 8 that use the percent of the population covered by 100 
percent smoke free laws.  Deaths and injuries are analyzed in Table 9. 
Table 4 considers counts of cigarette fires in all locations.  The first thing 
to notice is that both higher cigarette prices and excise taxes are associated with 
decreases in the counts of these fires, although the tax coefficients are not 
statistically significant at conventional levels, while the price coefficients are.  For 
continuous variables, the coefficients from the Poisson regression can be directly 
interpreted as semi-elasticities, that is, the percentage change in the number of 
fires resulting from a one unit change in the independent variable.   To get a semi-
elasticity for the dichotomous indicators, a transformation of the coefficients 
(exp(B)-1) is necessary (not shown).   Given the means of the price and tax, a one 
unit change represents a rather large effect.  The elasticities presented at the 
bottom of the table give a more reasonable interpretation to the estimates.  For 
ease of interpretation, the bottom of the table also list select marginal effects that 
show the absolute change in the counts of fires from one unit change in the 
relevant independent variable.   
The results in Table 4 show that a ten percent increase in price is 
associated with a decrease in fires of 6.3 to 7.5 percent, while a ten percent 
increase in tax is associated with a decrease in fires of 13.5 to 14.3 percent.  Off 
the sample mean of 92 fires per quarter, these translate to a reduction in 6 to 7 
fires quarterly for price and 12 to 13 fires quarterly for tax.   
Also of interest in Table 4 are the results of the SFA laws.  Smoking  
18 
 
restrictions in bars and restaurants have no statistical relationship with the total 
counts of cigarette fires.  However, relative to areas with no bans, restrictions and 
bans on smoking in private workplaces are associated with increases in fires.  
Restrictions are associated with an increase of about 14 fires per quarter, and bans 
are associated with an increase of about 11 fires per quarter.  Such results may 
occur if the restrictions do not decrease smoking (or the decrease occurs only 
among the careful smokers), and the restrictions induce a switch in the location of 
careless smokers.  Recall that Adda and Corneglia (2010) find no effect of 
workplace restrictions in reducing smoking.   
Table 5 contains the results for residential fires caused by cigarettes.  The 
results are rather similar to that for all fires, with the results showing negative 
price and tax effects with limited statistical significance.  The magnitudes here are 
also very similar to that of all fires with elasticities in the range of -0.6 to -0.7 for 
price and -0.15 to -0.16 for tax.  The SFA results are also very similar, in that 
workplace smoking restrictions are positively associated with residential fires 
while restrictions and bans in restaurants and bars have no effects.   
The reduced form models for restaurants, bars, and the sum of restaurants, 
bars and other eating/drinking establishments are shown in Table 6.  Results with 
taxes are not shown, but are very similar to the price results, which are all 
statistically insignificant.  However, the results of the SFA laws on restaurant and 
bar fires are provocative.  As shown for all locations, the ban on smoking in 
private workplaces is positively associated with counts of fires in these locations.  
Additionally, the coefficients on bans in smoking in restaurants and bars are 
positive in all models and are statistically significant in the four of the six models.  
Recall that Equation 3 above shows the total effect from bans on the incidence of 
fires can come about from both the change in the number of smokers and from the 
change in smoking behavior towards unsafe practices.   Even when bans are 
effective in reducing smoking, if the reduction is mostly among the safe smokers  
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and the remaining smokers act more carelessly, then we could easily see an 
increase in fires.  In bars and restaurants in particular, smokers who are banned 
from smoking indoors might simply move outside where careless cigarette 
disposal can start fires.     
In order to further examine the effects of the SFA laws, I re-estimate some 
models using the percent of the states’ populations covered by 100 percent smoke 
free air laws, that is, full bans on indoor smoking.  Table 7 shows no effect of 
these laws on cigarette fires of all types and residential fires, although for 
residential fires, a larger percentage of the state population with complete bans on 
smoking in bars is associated with a slight reduction in fires, but the magnitude is 
extremely small.  For restaurants and bars (Table 8), however, these bans are 
positively associated with fires, confirming the results using the dichotomous 
indicator variables for the bans.     
From a public health perspective, deaths and injuries from fires are the 
more serious concern.  I show results from all cigarette fires, but most of these 
deaths and injuries occur in residential structures;  in the sample used here, 95 
percent of all deaths and 90 percent of injuries are in residential locations.  Table 
9 shows the results of the cigarette prices and SFA policies on the total counts of 
deaths and injuries.  Results are shown with the average price and with the SFA 
laws as categories.  The coefficient on cigarette price is negative in all models, but 
only for deaths is it statistically significant at the 10 percent level, and only in one 
of the three models.
10   
As for the SFA laws, workplace bans are not statistically associated with 
deaths and injuries, while bans and restrictions in restaurants are positively related 
to deaths.  This contradicts the coefficient on the bar bans, which is negatively 
associated with total deaths and injuries, but not deaths alone.  In sum, these 
                                                 
10 Results with tax are similar in sign, but are not statistically significant.  
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results are puzzling and inconclusive.  Recall that workplace restrictions are 
associated with increases in the counts of residential fires, while restaurant and 
bar restrictions have no effects.  It should follow that deaths and injuries, which 
are primarily residential, are positively associated with workplace bans.  The 
coefficients are positive, but not significant at conventional levels.  As for the 
other SFA laws, note that Adda and Corneglia (2010) find that bans in bars and 
restaurants are associated with a reduction in time spent in these locations and an 
increase in time spent at home by smokers.  The increase in deaths associated 
with restaurant restrictions and bans corroborates their finding, but the negative 
sign on the bar bans refutes it.  Clearly, further research is necessary on this 
question.   
While the results presented thus far provide a lot of evidence that changes 
in cigarette policies over time are associated with changes in the incidence of 
fires, spurious correlation between these trends is still a worry.  I therefore re-
estimate some of the models presented above with the counts of fires caused by 
cooking as the dependent variable.  As can be seen in Figure 2, the trends in 
cooking fires are similar to those of the other types of fires, yet logically, they 
should not be related to cigarette smoking.  Any effects of the cigarette policies 
on the incidence of cooking fires would cast doubt on the main results.  However, 
as shown in Table 10, none of the policy variables are statistically significant in 
regressions explaining the variation in the incidence of cooking fires.  The same 
statement holds when examining deaths and injuries from cooking fires.  These 
results are not shown but are available upon request.  
The results of the other control variables are also of some interest.  These 
include the quarterly unemployment rate,  per capita income, the percent of each 
state’s population with at least a bachelor’s degree, the number of housing units 
per square mile and the dichotomous indicator for the states which have a fire safe 
cigarette law in effect.  The results of these variables are fairly consistent across  
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all specifications and can be generalized as follows:  Education, income and 
unemployment are generally not associated with fires, although states with higher 
income levels have fewer residential fires.  The number of residential units per 
square mile are negatively associated with counts of fires of all types and with 
residential fires, but are not related to deaths and injuries.  This result for the 
incidence of fires might reflect better fire awareness or prevention in urban areas.  
There might also simply be more people around to notice a fire and put it out 
before it gets out of control.   
The results from the fire safe cigarette laws show no association of these 
laws with counts of all fires or of residential fires, but a positive effect with 
restaurant and bar fires (see Tables 4, 5, and 6), and a negative effect on deaths 
and injuries (see Table 9).  Recall that during the time period under analysis, only 
5 states have this law in effect, and three passed the law in the last year of the 
data, so these results should be treated as suggestive.  It appears that the fire safe 
cigarettes are effective in reducing deaths and injuries as the law intends, 
however, there may also be some unanticipated effects that increase fires in 
restaurants and bars.  One reason this effect could arise is if there is a substitution 
toward less safe hand rolled cigarettes away from the fire safe cigarettes.  But, the 
substitution would need to only occur among restaurant and bar patrons in order 
to reconcile this with the reduction found for residential deaths.  If the 
demographics of the groups of smokers are different then this explanation could 
hold.  However, this is clearly an area for further research.   
 
Conclusions 
This paper examines the determinants of cigarette fires over time and 
questions whether public policies towards smoking have contributed to increases 
or decreases in these fires.  When smoking rates in the population decrease, one 
might expect to see fewer cigarette fires as a result.  However, this conclusion is  
22 
 
not guaranteed, as the decline in smoking may occur among the safest smokers, 
that is, those who are least likely to cause fires with their smoking behaviors.  The 
empirical results do point to a small positive relationship between annual per 
capita sales of cigarettes and the number of cigarette fires.  Using an instrumental 
variables approach, I estimate that each additional pack per capita sold is 
associated with a 2.2 percent increase in all cigarette fires and a 2.7 percent 
increase in fires in eating and drinking establishments. 
  Of more interest are the results of the reduced form models.  The 
conclusions can be summarized as follows:  Higher cigarette prices are associated 
with reductions in all fires and residential fires but not with restaurant and bar 
fires.  Higher prices are also negatively related to counts of deaths and injuries in 
fires, with the caveat that the coefficients are of limited statistical significance.  
Certain restrictions and bans on indoor smoking also influence fire rates, but the 
effect is to increase, rather than decrease, fires.  Specifically, workplace 
restrictions and bans are associated with increases in fires in all locations and in 
residential units.  Restaurant and bar bans are associated with increases in fires in 
restaurants and all eating/drinking establishments.   
The magnitude of the effects of the bans and restrictions on indoor 
smoking are not trivial.  For example, the results indicate that a workplace ban is 
associated with 10 additional fires on average per quarter.  The represents an 11 
percent increase over the mean.  Bans in smoking in restaurants result in an 
increase of 0.22 fires per quarter in eating and drinking establishments, or an 
increase of 15 percent over the mean of 1.46 fires per quarter. 
Further research needs to establish why these indoor smoking bans are 
causing more fires.  One likely explanation is that smokers change locations or 
behaviors as a result of the bans.  In the case of restaurants and bars, it is easy to 
imagine a person going outside to smoke and then improperly disposing of the 
cigarette in flammable material such as mulch or shrubbery.  The Star Tribune of  
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Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN reported an extreme case where a patron, facing an 
indoor smoking ban on a cold night, stayed inside and dropped his secretly 
smoked cigarette butt down an air duct, causing a fire and nearly $1 million worth 
of damages (Humphrey, 2009).   
  In the case of goods like cigarettes with negative externalities, there is a 
strong argument for governments to intercede and to enact policies designed to 
reduce the consumption of such goods.  The results of this paper exemplify that 
some policies, such as higher cigarette prices and fire safe cigarettes, can be 
effective in reducing some of the externalities.  However, the laws regulating the 
permissible location of smoking present a situation where the public policy 
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Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Count of cigarette fires, all locations  91.55  127.34  0  1085 
Count of residential cigarette fires   32.10  40.74  0  295 
Count of cigarette fires in restaurants  1.11  2.15  0  35 
Count of cigarette fires in bars  0.19  0.52  0  5 
Count of cigarette fires in restaurants, bars  
and other eating establishments  1.46  2.60  0  39 
Count of fires caused by cooking  116.04  169.51  0  1255 
Deaths from cigarette fires, all locations  0.64  1.16  0  9 
Deaths and injuries from cigarette fires, all locations  4.04  6.21  0  59 
Deaths from residential cigarette fires  0.61  1.12  0  9 
Deaths and injuries from residential cigarette fires  3.64  5.58  0  57 
Deaths from fires caused by cooking  0.25  0.77  0  11 
Deaths and injuries from fires caused by cooking  1.33  2.80  0  27 
Cigarette sales per capita in number of packs  74.80  28.50  31.05  184.4 
Real average price of cigarettes  1.99  0.38  1.20  3.92 
Real state excise tax on cigarettes  0.37  0.30  0.01  1.80 
Restriction on smoking in private workplaces  0.39  0.49  0  1 
Ban on smoking in private workplaces  0.13  0.34  0  1 
Restriction on smoking in restaurants   0.49  0.50  0  1 
Ban on smoking in restaurants  0.15  0.35  0  1 
Ban on smoking in bars  0.10  0.30  0  1 
% of state pop. covered by 100% SFA law, private 
workplaces  14.89  31.81  0  100 
% of state pop. covered by 100% SFA law, 
restaurants  18.46  36.19  0  100 
% of state pop. covered by 100% SFA law, bars  11.97  30.34  0  100 
Fire safe cigarette law  0.02  0.14  0  1 
Housing units per square mile  271.86  1060.22  2.49  10597.82 
% of state pop. with a bachelor’s degree  26.40  5.00  15.10  47.50 
Real income per capita  17.03  2.68  5.23  30.06 
Quarterly unemployment rate  4.71  1.16  2.13  9.67 





  All Fires  Residential  Restaurants  Bars  All Eating/Drink Estab. 





















































































































































  All Fire Deaths  All Fires Deaths + injury  Residential Deaths  Residential 
Deaths+ Injury 























































































































































































































Price/tax elasticity ‐ 0.63 ‐ 0.75 ‐ 0.73 ‐ 0.14 ‐ 0.14 ‐ 0.14 
Change in count from $1 
change in price/tax  
‐14.12 ‐ 16.73 ‐ 16.30 ‐ 16.06 ‐ 17.04 ‐ 16.36 
Change in count from SFA 
restriction change from 0 to 1 
13.99  2.40   14.94  2.49  
Change in count from  SFA 
ban change from 0 to 1 










































































































Price/tax elasticity ‐ 0.631 ‐ 0.710 ‐ 0.683 ‐ 0.157 ‐ 0.159 ‐ 0.153 
Change in count from $1 
change in price/tax  
‐5.05 ‐ 5.69 ‐ 5.47 ‐ 6.68 ‐ 6.79 ‐ 6.52 
Change in count from SFA 
restriction change from 0 to 1 
4.81 ‐ 0.41   5.14 ‐ 0.26  
Change in count from  SFA 
ban change from 0 to 1 
























































































































































Price elasticity ‐ 0.342 ‐ 0.493 ‐ 0.583  0.483  0.336  0.304 ‐ 0.485 ‐ 0.665 ‐ 0.677 
Change in count from $1 
change in price  
‐0.04 ‐ 0.05 ‐ 0.06  0.002  0.002  0.001 ‐ 0.11 ‐ 0.15 ‐ 0.15 
Change in count from SFA 
restriction change from 0 to 1 
0.05  0.004   0.004  0.0005   0.13  0.03  
Change in count from  SFA ban 
change from 0 to 1 








































Price elasticity ‐ 0.71 ‐ 0.71 ‐ 0.70 ‐ 0.72 ‐ 0.69 ‐ 0.65 
Change in count from $1 change in price    ‐15.94 ‐ 15.86 ‐ 15.71 ‐ 5.73 ‐ 5.57 ‐ 5.19 
Change in count from 1 percentage point 
change in SFA 






















































Price elasticity ‐ 0.39 ‐ 0.48 ‐ 0.62  0.30  0.27  0.27 ‐ 0.57 ‐ 0.64 ‐ 0.70 
Change in count from $1 change in price    ‐0.04 ‐ 0.05 ‐ 0.07  0.002  0.001  0.001 ‐ 0.13 ‐ 0.14 ‐ 0.16 
Change in count from 1 percentage point 
change in SFA  










































































































Price elasticity ‐ 0.91 ‐ 1.05 ‐ 0.97 ‐ 0.27 ‐ 0.31 ‐ 0.22 
Change in count from $1 
change in price  
‐0.09 ‐ 0.10 ‐ 0.10 ‐ 0.23 ‐ 0.27 ‐ 0.19 
Change in count from SFA 
restriction change from 0 to 1 
0.05  0.10   0.10  0.59  
Change in count from  SFA 
ban change from 0 to 1 









  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Cigarette price  ‐0.138 
(‐0.95) 
‐0.154 
(‐1.18) 
‐0.097 
(‐0.82)     
Cigarette tax 
   
‐0.028 
(‐0.17) 
‐0.026 
(‐0.19) 
0.039
(0.29)
SFA restriction: workplaces   0.172 
(1.13)    
0.179 
(1.16)    
SFA ban:  workplaces  0.106 
(0.74)    
0.097 
(0.67)    
SFA restriction: restaurants  
 
‐0.059
(‐0.46)   
‐0.071 
(‐0.55)  
SFA ban:  restaurants 
 
‐0.017
(‐0.10)   
‐0.044 
(‐0.27)  
SFA ban: bars 
  
‐0.126
(‐0.93)   
‐0.153
(‐1.09)
Fire safe cigarette law  0.188 
(0.62) 
0.123 
(0.40) 
0.192 
(0.66) 
0.185 
(0.60) 
0.116 
(0.37) 
0.200 
(0.69) 
Houses per sq mile  ‐0.001 
(‐3.42) 
‐0.001 
(‐3.50) 
‐0.001 
(‐3.55) 
‐0.001 
(‐3.41) 
‐0.001 
(‐3.50) 
‐0.001 
(‐3.57) 
% bachelors  ‐0.017 
(‐1.10) 
‐0.016 
(‐1.13) 
‐0.013 
(‐0.88) 
‐0.020 
(‐1.26) 
‐0.018 
(‐1.33) 
‐0.015 
(‐1.02) 
Per capita income  ‐0.083 
(‐1.75) 
‐0.100 
(‐2.06) 
‐0.089 
(‐1.83) 
‐0.076 
(‐1.59) 
‐0.093 
(‐1.91) 
‐0.081 
(‐1.71) 
Unemployment rate  ‐0.020 
(‐0.36) 
‐0.009 
(‐0.16) 
‐0.003 
(‐0.04) 
‐0.022 
(‐0.41) 
‐0.010 
(‐0.18) 
‐0.003 
(‐0.05) 
Notes:  N=1750. T‐statistics in parentheses, intercept not shown.  Models also include indicator 
variables for states and year/quarters.   
 
 